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Economists  are  increasingly  concluding  that  their 
simplifying assumptions about preferences are too simple. 
In  particular,  the  idea  that  preferences  might  be 
constructed rather than fixed is being explored.  In this 
companion  piece  to  my more  detailed  consideration  of 
this subject, I argue that what makes the assumption of 
fixed  preferences  possible  is  a  myth,  the  myth  of 
discovery—that preferences exist to be discovered.  Once 
we acknowledge that preferences are as much made as 
found,  and that  the raw materials  from which they are 
made  are  scarcely  stable,  the  assumption  of  fixed 
preferences  becomes  far  less  tenable.   My  exposition 
proceeds through a discussion of a recent book arguing 
that  choice  is  not  all  it  is  cracked  up  to  be,  Barry 
Schwartz’s The Paradox of Choice.1
2. (HOW) CAN TOO MUCH CHOICE BE BAD?
In The Paradox of Choice, Barry Schwartz argues that 
more choice can be bad.  Schwartz’s narrative reads as 
though he arrived at this view from his own experience. 
When Schwartz was in college, he found it easy to buy 
jeans. He would go to the store, pick out a pair of jeans in 
his size, and buy them.  Recently, he went to buy jeans. 
The salesperson at the store offered him “slim-fit, easy fit, 
relaxed  fit,  baggy,  extra  baggy . . .,  stonewashed,  acid-
washed, distressed . . ., button-fly, zipper-fly . . ., faded or 
regular?”2 He  was  forced  to  attend  to  intricacies  and 
permutations he had never imagined. Perhaps worse still, 
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he was filled with doubt as to what he wanted. And it is 
not as though when he got home with his more carefully 
chosen jeans he  realized what  he had been missing in 
college.  The whole experience was a big waste of time 
from start to finish.
There are many reasons why Schwartz’s story might 
not have a message that is generally applicable.  Though 
these increments do not matter to him, they may matter 
to other people.   After all,  I  know people who say they 
“eat to live,” and are quite indifferent about the taste of 
food. (I will admit that I do not know many such people. 
Okay, one.)  Schwartz may be idiosyncratic in not caring 
about  various  kinds  of  differences.   Or  he  may  simply 
have gotten the wrong jeans.  The perfect pair of jeans for 
him  may  exist,  but  his  impatience  (and,  maybe,  his 
general obliviousness) prevented him from finding them 
(and  might  have  prevented  him  from  appreciating  the 
difference between the pair he acquired and the pair he 
could  have  acquired).   How  many  people  are  like 
Schwartz, or at least enough like him in this respect that 
his  conclusion  follows  in  any  meaningful  sense?  Are 
enough people happier with the multi-jean selection than 
the  single-jean  selection  that  the  waste  of  time  by 
Schwartz and his ilk (including the cost of not having the 
books he would otherwise have been able to write had he 
not been choosing jeans) is a worthwhile price to pay?
A response one might make to this line of argument—
and  that  many  commentators  have  made3—is  that  an 
objection to more choice is  ridiculous.   People  can just 
limit the choices available to them by adopting some sort 
of  decision rule.  Moreover,  market mechanisms exist  to 
help people choose. Consider, for instance, the Michelin 
restaurant guide, Consumer Reports, or even the ratings 
on  Amazon.com.  And,  even  if  Schwartz  is  right,  what 
follows? 4 That  we should  limit  others’  choices  because 
3
3
. See,  e.g.,  Ronald Bailey,  Multitudes in  the Valley of  Decision, 
REASON ONLINE,  Jan.  28,  2004, 
http://www.reason.com/news/show/34754.html;  Charles  Paul  Freund, 
Option Overload, REASON ONLINE, Apr. 2004, http://www. reason.com/news/
show/29084.html; Virginia Postrel, I’m Pro-Choice, FORBES, Mar. 28, 2005. 
But see Kevin Cheng, Choosing to Give Choices, OK/CANCEL, June 3, 2005, 
http://www.ok-cancel.com/archives/article/2005/06/choosing-to-give-
choices.html  (discussing the pros and cons of limiting choice in user 
interface design for computer software and websites).
4
4
. And indeed,  one commentator  suggests  that  some objections 
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Schwartz finds choosing unpleasant and not worthwhile?
Certainly,  Schwartz  would  not  advocate  any  such 
thing,  except  perhaps  in  very  limited  spheres  with  a 
strong  public  interest.5 Indeed,  his  main  policy 
prescription, if what he recommends warrants that label, 
is  one that  economists would not have difficulties with: 
that individuals need to develop a strategy to deal with 
the  multitude  of  choices  around  them,  and  with 
made to Schwartz’s position may instead be to what might be thought 
to  follow.  See Posting  of  Michael  to  2Blowhards, 
http://www.2blowhards.com/archives/00207  1.html  (June  16,  2005) 
(arguing that objections to Schwartz’s view are motivated by an implicit 
and illicit move to the policy considerations thought to flow from it).
The  discussion  here  [on  another  blog  the  poster  refers  to] 
seems  to  be  set  up  as  an  either/or:  you’re  either  for  more 
consumer  choice,  or  you’re  a  statist  asshole  who  wants  to 
Stalinize everyone else’s life . . .
But why can’t we take another tack entirely? Why not recognize 
that some if not many people—OK, maybe not you specifically—
sometimes do find it more than a little bewildering to be living 
in  such  consumer  cornucopia  conditions?  Why  shouldn’t 
stopping at this point for a few seconds not be legit? Why not 
just discuss what we (or many other people) find contempo [sic] 
life to be like without instantly advancing to the policy-decision 
stage?
I think there’s lots of value in pausing over the “what it’s like” 
part of the discussion before roaring ahead into the “what must 
be done” part.  . .  . If  the free market is about being able to 
participate as you want—well, when you’re feeling blurry and 
confused (ie., [sic] overwhelmed by huge amounts of choice), 
how do you figure out what you want?
Id.  One objection certainly fits this characterization.  See Bailey,  supra 
note 3.
One suspects that [Schwartz’s] unspoken [view] is that sound 
public policy consists of the government restricting options and 
forcing Americans to  do what  people like  Professor  Schwartz 
think is  good for  them.  Such choice-restricting policies  have 
included Prohibition, the drug war, wage-price controls, publicly 
financed  education,  bankrupt  Social  Security  and  Medicare 





. Retirement savings plans might be an example.  See generally 
Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen Utkus, Lessons from Behavioral Finance for 
Retirement Plan Design,  in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE:  NEW LESSONS FROM 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE. (Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus, eds., 2004).  See 
also George Loewenstein, Costs and Benefits of Health and Retirement 
Related Choice, in SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE: INDIVIDUAL VS. COLLECTIVE RISK AND 
RESPONSIBILITY. (Sheila Burke et al., eds., 2000).  Also, consider the work of 
Richard Thaler, Daniel Kahneman, Terence Odean, Cass Sunstein, and 
others  on  the  extent  to  which  people  trade  too  much,  make  bad 
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information “overload” more broadly.6  Schwartz argues 
that “satisficing,” choosing something “good enough,” is a 
far better idea than “maximizing,” holding out for the best 
possible  thing.   Interestingly,  psychologists  Ketalaar  & 
Clore argue that the feeling of falling in love has precisely 
this intention—to make people choose something “good 
enough” rather than endlessly seeking perfection.7
Schwartz  differs  with  his  critics  in  being  far  more 
sympathetic to the choice-impaired.  His critics may think 
that people who do not develop strategies for dealing with 
too many choices have only themselves to blame.  They 
also may very well believe that the market will take care 
of the problem, creating a new niche for those who can 
reduce information flow to manageable sizes.  Yes, there 
may be a transition period as  the market develops the 
necessary expertise—but, in the long run, the problem will 
be properly solved.  We will have the advantages of more 
choice without the disadvantages.  Schwartz  presumably 
would not rule out that in the long run, and maybe even in 
the moderate run, the winnowing-down market niche may 
be filled.  He would disagree with the economists, though, 
as to how soon it would be filled, and the costs along the 
way, and how successful the fillers will be.
The main thrust of Schwartz’s argument is empirical. 
He cites experimental evidence to support the proposition 
that  more  choice  causes  less  happiness  and  more 
anxiety,8 and sometimes, fewer purchases, as people give 
choices,  have  greater  difficulties  in  the  face  of  more  options,  etc. 
Literature under the general rubric of “libertarian paternalism” or “the 
new paternalism” also argues that attempts to influence and perhaps 
limit choice may be a good thing, using reasoning that Schwartz might 
very  well  find  congenial.   See,  e.g.,   Richard  H.  Thaler  &  Cass  R. 
Sunstein,  Libertarian Paternalism,  93 AMER.  ECON.  REV. 175 (2003). 
See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008).  But see 
Claire A Hill, Anti-Anti-Anti Paternalism, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 444 (2007) 
(appraising and critiquing the libertarian/new paternalists’ arguments).
6
6
. Consider in this regard some headings from the last part of The 
Paradox of Choice: “1. Choose When to Choose,” “3. Satisfice More and 
Maximize Less,” “7. Regret Less,” “10. Curtail Social Comparison,” and 
“11. Learn to Love Constraints.” SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 221–36.
7
7
. Timothy  Ketelaar,  &  Gerald  Clore,  Emotions  and  Reason: 
Proximate  Effects  and  Ultimate  Functions,  in  PERSONALITY,  EMOTION,  AND 
COGNITIVE SCIENCE 355 (G. Matthews ed., 1997).
8
8
. One might think, to the contrary, that having more choices make 
people happy.  But some evidence suggests otherwise.  More money 
gives  people  more  choices.   But  some  research  demonstrates  that 
individuals who unexpectedly get wealth (e.g., by winning the lottery) 
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in  to  paralysis. 9  Somebody sympathetic  to  Schwartz’s 
argument might think that it is a good thing that Schwartz 
relies on the empirics.  How can anybody possibly argue 
as a matter of theory that more choice sometimes is not 
good?10
In fact, such an argument follows from the increasing 
recognition  that  preferences  are  not  as  neoclassical 
economists have hypothesized them to be.  Neoclassical 
economists  use (believe  in?)  the rational  choice model. 
The  rational  choice  model  assumes  and  requires  that 
preferences  are  stable,  determinate,  coherent  and 
invariant to mode of elicitation.11 The appropriate rhetoric 
is therefore one of discovery: when people make choices, 
they are “revealing” their preferences. More colloquially, 
as  to  any  object  x,  a  person  knows  how  she  ranks  it 
relative  to  some  other  objects  y  and  z  and  she  is 
consistent in her ranking.  A banana? Better than an apple 
but worse than an orange.  And confronted with a choice 
quickly  return  to  their  pre-winning  level  of  happiness.   See,  e.g., 
Timothy  D.  Wilson  et  al.,  Making  Sense:  The  Causes  of  Emotional 
Evanescence,  in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS:  RATIONALITY AND WELL 
BEING 209 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003).
9
9
. Anecdotal  evidence  abounds  for  the  phenomena  Schwartz  is 
describing.  See, e.g., Ellen Warren, Choose or Lose: Too Many Options 
at the Big Box Stores? Indecisive Shopping Online? We’re Here to Help, 
CHI. TRIB., July 28, 2005, at 4.
“Don’t go in there!” the paint store man warned me as I headed 
for a large alcove labeled “Custom Color Center” at J.C. Licht 
Co. in Oak Park.
This  after  I  told  him I  was  getting freaked  out  by too  many 
choices.
Was he ever right. I should have never even started looking at 
all those paint chips. Did you know that there are at least 175 
different  shades  of  white  paint?  And  that’s  from  just  one 
manufacturer. I counted them.
. . .
And the bottom line: I have five different rooms in five different 
shades  of  white.  And  you  know  what?  You  couldn’t  tell  the 




. Note that this formulation glosses over well-known ways within 
the traditional neoclassical account in which less choice can sometimes 
be  beneficial,  such  as  a  strategy  of  pre-commitment.   But  the 
neoclassical account assumes that more choice should be good except 
when, under particular circumstances, it is not.  My argument disputes 
the worldview embedded in this assumption.
11 . See Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON LIT. 11 
(1998) [hereinafter Rabin, Psychology]; GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH 
TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5 (1976).
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between the banana and the orange, she will always take 
the orange.12 And as between the orange and the apple, 
she will  always take the orange.13  But scholars outside 
the  field  of  economics,  and  increasing  numbers  of 
economists, believe that  preferences are constructed as 
they are elicited.14  Preferences are as much created as 
discovered.
What  does  it  mean  to  say  that  preferences  are 
constructed?  How  are  preferences  constructed?  What 
determines  someone’s  preferences?  At  this  point,  no 
detailed account has been formulated, much less one that 
commands a consensus.15 Clearly, there is no formula by 
which  preferences  can  reliably  be  influenced,  as  was 
conjured up in the 1960’s era critiques of Madison Avenue 
(and corporate America more broadly).16 In such critiques, 
12
1
. While the model speaks as though it does not formally take into 
account getting sick of something you have had a lot of, economists are 
of course sensible enough to acknowledge that after the fifth banana, 
you  might  choose  an  apple,  and  have  a  formal  term  for  this 
phenomenon, declining marginal utility.
13 . A series of well-known experiments has demonstrated violations 
of this principle.  See Eldar Shafir et al., Reason-Based Choice, in CHOICES, 
VALUES AND FRAMES 597 (Daniel  Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds.,  2000) 
(discussing  one  important  such  experiment);  Claire  A.  Hill,  The 
Rationality of Preference Construction (and the Irrationality of Rational  
Choice), 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 689, 700 (2008).
14 . Hill,  supra note  13,  at  704  n.52  (discussing  some  of  the 
literature on the topic).
15 . Even the economists’ model could address the question of how 
preferences are determined.  Thinking preferences are fixed does not 
exclude being interested  in how they come to be as  they are.   But 
instead,  economists  hypothesize  a  black  box  (de  gustibus  non  est 
disputandum).   There  may  be  some evolutionary  determinants,  and 
there are, colloquially, some canonically preferred things (money and 
power,  most  notably).  Mostly,  however,  the  issue  is  deemed  to  be 
outside the realm of proper economic inquiry; it is therefore typically 
not addressed.
16 . See, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER, CITIZEN ACTION AND OTHER BIG IDEAS: A HISTORY OF 
RALPH NADER AND THE MODERN CONSUMER MOVEMENT (1991),  available  at 
http://www.nader.org/history/bollier_chapter_2.html.  Bollier’s  book 
approvingly  describes  a  group,  the  Center  for  the  Study  of 
Commercialism,
dedicated  to  fighting  not  just  individual  acts  and  policies  of 
irresponsible  businesses  but  the  very  culture  of  “mass 
commercialism run  amok.”  Michael  F.  Jacobson,  founder  and 
executive director of Center for Science in the Public Interest, 
decided it was time to confront the “buy till you die” ethic that 
now  invades  every  nook  and  cranny  of  American  life  and 
corrodes our cultural life.
Id. The  group’s  mission is  “to  combat  Madison Avenue’s  advertising 
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advertisers  (and  manufacturers)  were  characterized  as 
evil folk who created demand for products, services, or a 
lifestyle that most people previously did not want, could 
not  afford  and  would  not—or  maybe  should  not—make 
them happy  even  if  they  could  afford  it.   To  say  that 
preferences are in significant measure created rather than 
discovered is not to ascribe to anyone the power to create 
them.
Not that it needs to be said, but Schwartz is of course 
not signing on to this type of criticism, nor is he signing on 
to  an  alternate  advertisers  (and  manufacturers)-are-evil 
criticism:  that  people  really  do want  the  things  the 
advertisers are trying to sell them but that the advertisers 
are evil  for depicting the things so attractively  because 
people  should not want them—say, because they cannot 
afford them or should be less focused on acquisition and 
more on other-regarding pursuits (and the manufacturers 
are  evil  for  making  the  things  in  the  first  place). 
Interestingly,  a  related  argument  has  made  inroads 
against smoking.  Ads directed to minority communities 
arguing  that  to smoke is  to  be a  dupe to  the majority 
community’s  manufacturers  and  advertisers  have  had 
some  success,  as  have  ads,  directed  to  young  people, 
arguing  that  to  smoke  is  to  be  a  dupe  to  corporate 
America.17
barrage (3,000 messages a day) and to encourage a simpler lifestyle, 
moderate  consumption  and  civic  involvement.”  Id. According  to  the 
founder  of  the  group,  and Professor  Ronald  K.  L.  Collins  of  Catholic 
University  Law  School:  “[t]oday’s  marketers  promote  artificial  and 
obsessional wants, urge ceaseless spending, foster a disposable society, 
and inject commercialism into every facet of our lives . . . . All  of this 
treads  on  our  moral  and  civic  tradition  like  a  bulldozer  in  a  flower 
garden.” Id.
A search on Amazon.com for books with “Madison Avenue” in the title 
yields  The Messiah of Madison Avenue, by Patrick Cunningham.  The 
site’s description of the book begins with the following: “Tracer Wolf is 
the hottest  name on Madison Avenue. Flashy,  dynamic, brilliant,  and 
totally  amoral.”  Amazon.com,  http://www.amazon.com/Messiah-
Madison-Avenue-Patrick-Cunningham/dp/0595317448/ref=sr_1_1?




. See Carrie McLaren, How Tobacco Company “Anti-Smoking” Ads 
Appeal  to  Teens, STAY FREE!,  Summer  2000, 
http://www.stayfreemagazine.  org/archives/17/tobacco-anti-
smoking.html  (“The underlying message of  the campaign is  that,  far 
from symbolizing  freedom  and  adulthood,  tobacco  use  is  a  form  of 
obedience—obedience  to  tobacco  companies.”);  Social  Marketing 
Institute,  Success Stories: Florida “Truth” Campaign, http://www.social-
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3. SOME THINGS WE CAN SAY ABOUT PREFERENCE 
CONSTRUCTION
What  can  we  say  affirmatively  about  preference 
construction? In a companion piece, I discuss the matter 
in detail.  Here, I stress only three features of my account. 
First,  people  often  make  choices  based  on  something 
other  than the inherent  attributes  of  what  they choose 
and do not choose.  People often choose things based on 
what “sort of things the things are”—this perfume is the 
sort of thing glamorous people wear, eating a low-fat diet 
and  exercising  is  the  sort  of  thing  people  who  live  a 
healthy lifestyle do, donating to this charity is the sort of 
thing  civic-minded people  do,  etc.   Thus,  even if  one’s 
preferences  for  glamour,  a  healthy  lifestyle  and  civic 
mindedness are fixed, what one will choose is not fixed at 
all.  Considerable  effort  is  spent  by  private  and  public 
parties  to  change  our  views  on  the  specifics  of  these 
matters.  Consider in this regard the following example. 
Type  into  Google  the  search  terms  “car”  and  “male 
menopause” and see what comes up.  One typical search 
result follows:
[A]  wife  realised  something  was  badly  wrong  when  the 
headlights of  her husband’s car hit the kitchen wall  at  knee-
level instead of waist-level one evening. He had sold the Volvo 
and  bought  a  red,  open-topped  sports  car.  (Apparently  over 
80%  of  such  cars  are  sold  to  sad  sacks  who  believe  this 
throbbing mechanical  extension  makes  them look young and 
virile not old and desperate.)18
How did these types of cars come to connote youth 
and virility? Might it have been otherwise? Might it come 
to  be  otherwise,  especially  if  environmental  concerns 
come more to the forefront?
Second, we have more choices to make than we have 
time to obtain “complete” (or perhaps even “sufficient”) 
information19 to make them.  For many choices, especially 
those  of  comparatively  little  consequence,  having  a 
decision-making  strategy  makes  far  more  sense  than 
having some pre-existing preference menu that we would 
marketing.org/success/cs-floridatruth.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
18
1
. Amanda Craig, Male Menopause, http://www.amandacraig.com/ 
pages/journalism /features/male_menopause.htm (last visited, Apr. 20, 
2008).
19 . It  is  not  at  all  clear  what  information  would  be  complete  or 
sufficient for just about any choice.  Still, for present purposes, what is 
meant is clear enough.
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have to consult.  The strategy can take many forms: make 
the  most  or  least  expensive  choice,  pick  something 
different  each time,  pick the  thing  that  takes the  least 
time to acquire, pick the thing that’s available at the store 
where I like the people, pick randomly, etc.  It can also be 
a strategy about strategies: I will spend no more than x 
amount of time making a relatively unimportant (however 
defined)  decision.   Note  that  the  case  for  preferring  a 
strategy over a pre-existing menu is even stronger than 
the preceding argument makes it seem: often, there is no 
pre-determined choice set about which one could make 
inquiries.20  In  some  of  the  paradigmatic  contexts  that 
Schwartz is concerned with—a trip to the supermarket, for 
instance—assuming  the  existence  of  such  a  choice  set 
works well enough.  But in many other important contexts 
it does not.  I discussed this issue in a previous article:
One example comes from an article in The New York Times by 
Virginia Postrel,  a prominent libertarian thinker. A justification 
for  affirmative  action,  she  says,  is  that  people  choose  not 
among all  possible alternatives  but among the “evoked set,” 
which is  necessarily a subset  of  the full  set.  They are hence 
more  likely  to  choose  a  member  of  the  evoked  set.  After 
discussing  this  phenomenon  in  the  context  of  toothpaste, 
Postrel  extends  it  to  affirmative  action.  She  notes  that  a 
previous article in  The New York Times  had given very short 
shrift to the African-American action movie stars Will Smith and 
Wesley Snipes. According to Postrel,
The  evoked  set  of  action  “stars”  didn’t  overlap  with  the 
evoked  set  of  “black  movie  stars.”  There  was  no  racial 
hostility  at  work,  just the limits  of  human minds and the 
categories they create.21
Third,  making  choices  is  not  a  meta-process—some 
straightforward means to the “end” of making the choice. 
The  process  of  “obtaining  information”  is  implicitly 
assumed to be far more tractable than it is.  But in many 
cases, the process is quite complicated.  How would one 
decide  whether  to  donate  to  charity  and  if  so,  which 
charity  to  choose?  The  potential  considerations  are 
enormous and hard to assess.  It is not just that the choice 
20
2
. Claire A.  Hill,  Beyond Mistakes:  The Next Wave of  Behavioral  
Law and Economics, 29 QUEEN’S L.J. 563, 581–83 (2004) (discussing the 
conceit  that  there  are  pre-existing  choice  sets,  and  some  of  the 
consequences the conceit leads to).
21 . Id. (quoting Virginia Postrel, Economic Scene: The Lessons of the 
Grocery Shelf  Also Have Something to  Say About  Affirmative  Action, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2003, at C2).
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set  is  not  pre-determined—the  problem  is  far  more 
profound.  There is no mechanical means of proceeding; 
moreover,  it  will  be necessary  to  stop  before  acquiring 
“complete” information (and at some point that is hard to 
characterize  ex  ante—when  does  one  have  “enough” 
information?).   When  I  seek  to  purchase  something 
fungible, I compare prices for x period of time.  My sister 
compares prices for 10x period of time.  How did either of 
us arrive at our methods for price comparison? Also, after 
my comparisons, I do not second guess my decision; my 
sister does.  In Schwartz’s terminology, I satisfice and she 
maximizes.   This  suggests  that  the  process  itself  is  of 
import and note, and is itself amenable to appraisal.  And 
the appraisal is not just as to how good the process is at 
helping one “find what one wants.” Rather, it is a more 
ephemeral and hard-to-pin-down assessment, focused on 
the  choice  and  the  process  by  which  the  choice  was 
made, and the interaction between the two.  There are all 
sorts of ancillary effects to be taken into account.  One is 
regret,  a  great  concern  of  Schwartz’s.   Indeed,  in  this 
regard, it  has been demonstrated that some people will 
have  regrets  if  the  outcome  is  bad,  regardless  of  the 
process by which the outcome came to be.  Others might 
not  regret  a  bad  outcome so  long  as  the  process  was 
sound. If I buy what I think is the best widget after doing 
some research but later find out there was a better (on 
some  relevant  metric)  one  available,  will  I  regret  my 
choice?  If  the  process  I  used  was  sound  (as  I  assess 
soundness), I might not regret my choice if I  am in the 
latter  category.  Moreover,  insofar  as  there  is  no  pre-
determined sense that there is a “discovery” potentially 
to be made at some point, process itself becomes even 
more important. If Smith will be applying a decision rule to 
a  relatively  inconsequential  decision  (for  instance, 
choosing ketchup at the grocery store), he may be best 
off if he can use some decision rule that is ready at hand 
(buy the name brand that’s cheapest) rather than having 
to construct a more tailored one when confronted with an 
elaborate array of choices.  The chance that Smith would 
be so much happier with the time-intensive choice than 
with the choice based on the ready-at-hand decision rule 
that  it  would warrant  his  additional  time expenditure is 
small.
Fourth,  the  choice  process  implicates  how we  view 
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ourselves  and  how  others  might  view  us.   What  do 
potential  contracting  partners  think  when  I  ask  first  to 
discuss  the  clauses  that  cover  the  dissolution  of  the 
venture we are proposing to set up? What kind of person 
am I to consider whether to spend my bonus on a deluxe 
mattress when people are starving in Ruritania? 
What follows? First, that the case for as much choice 
as  possible  is  decidedly  more  measured  once  we 
acknowledge how people  choose,  and how they do not 
choose—that  they  do  not  choose  by  consulting  “pre-
existing free standing preference menus.”22  What people 
do  in  making  choices  is  part  discovery  (having  tried 
oysters, I now know I like them and may get them again) 
and part creation (I will be more inclined to get oysters 
because I like to think of myself as, and to be thought of 
as, an adventurous eater and I believe oyster-eating will 
help  me  achieve  this).   Given  positive  and  significant 
information costs, even if all  choices were “discoveries” 
we  might  be  worse  off  with  too  many  choices.   That 
choices are also creations that could have been otherwise 
makes the case all the stronger.
None  of  this  is  to  suggest  that  any  particular 
regulatory policy prescription follows.  That being said, my 
arguments  and  Schwartz’s  views  are  clearly  consistent 
with  an  important  component  of  the  literature  on 
libertarian or “new” paternalism,23 which seeks to justify 
to  libertarians  regulatory  interventions  in  certain 
traditionally  paternalistic  spheres.   In  my  companion 
article,  I  argue  that  even  though  the  justification  may 
ultimately  not  work,  the  new  paternalists  may 
nevertheless  come  to  the  right  conclusions.   The 
justification ultimately turns  on the assumption that  we 
can determine what people “really want”—that they really 
want,  for  instance,  to  forsake  short-term  pleasure  (for 
instance,  eating  a  calorie-laden  meal)  for  long-term 
rewards (health  and longer life).   We cannot make this 
determination,  but  neither  can  we  make  the 
22
2
. See  Cass R. Sunstein,  Endogenous Preferences, Environmental 
Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217 (1993); Hill, supra note 13, at 705 n.57. There 
may  be  sophisticated  ways  to  map  strategies  onto  some  form  of 
preference menu.  The mapping would yield something unwieldy and 
very hard to use; even some economists might prefer to concede the 
point  in  the  face  of  such  a  massive  assault  on  much-vaunted 
methodological parsimony.
23 . See, e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 5.
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determination  the  neoclassical  economists  make,  that 
what  we  really  want  is  what  we  actually  do—in  this 
example, eat the large meal.  Because there is no clear 
way for law to respect what people really want, trying to 
do so ought not to trump other legitimate aims.24
4. CONCLUSION
Barry Schwartz’s argument in the Paradox of Choice 
potentially  raises  serious  difficulties  for  neoclassical 
economists.  To  ordinary  mortals,  however,  it  is 
overwhelmingly  intuitive.   Fidelity’s  mutual  funds 
webpage reads:  “Browse Fidelity  Funds.  More than 175 
ways to help you build a diversified portfolio.”25  No listing 
of  the  funds  follows,  of  course.   A  graphic  underneath 
illustrates  the  selection  process,  breaking  down  the 
decision  into  small,  manageable  chunks.   And  a  good 
thing too.  Not just for the obvious reason—that Fidelity 
knows its funds better than you do. Rather, it is because 
the incremental value of more choice may very well  be 
smaller  than  the  associated  benefit,  especially  when 
information costs,  opportunity  costs,  and other ancillary 
costs,  such  as  the  potential  for  regret,  are  taken  into 
account.   Indeed,  Schwartz’s  account  underscores  that 
choosing isn’t just a simple process of discovery.  When 
we choose, we do many other things as well: we may find 
out  about  ourselves,  convey  information  to  others,  set 
ourselves up for good or bad feelings down the line (my 
fund did well—I am savvy or lucky; my fund did badly—I 
am a financial  dolt  or  unlucky)  and potentially,  actions 
based  thereon.   In  sum,  a  thorough  cost/benefit 
calculation will not always favor more choice.
24
2
. Hill, supra note 13, at 731.
25 . Fidelity.com,  Browse  Available  Mutual  Funds, 
http://personal.fidelity. 
com/products/funds/content/WhatYouCanBuy/browse_all_funds.shtml.cv
sr?refpr=mfrt33 (last visited May 13, 2008).
